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LEARNING FROM LEARNING MACHINES:
OPTIMISATION, RULES, AND SOCIAL NORMS
TRAVIS LACROIX1,2
YOSHUA BENGIO2,3
Abstract. There is an analogy between machine learning systems and eco-
nomic entities in that they are both adaptive, and their behaviour is specified in
a more or less explicit way. It appears that the area of AI that is most analogous
to the behaviour of economic entities is that of morally good decision-making,
but it is an open question as to how precisely moral behaviour can be achieved
in an AI system. This paper explores the analogy between these two complex
systems, and we suggest that a clearer understanding of this apparent analogy
may help us forward in both the socio-economic domain and the AI domain:
known results in economics may help inform feasible solutions in AI safety, but
also known results in AI may inform economic policy. If this claim is correct,
then the recent successes of deep learning for AI suggest that more implicit
specifications work better than explicit ones for solving such problems.
Keywords — AI Safety; (Implicit) Social Norms; (Explicit) Rules and Laws;
Optimisation Problems; Representation of Complex Functions; Boundary Prob-
lems; Social Dynamics; Regulation; Socio-Economic Entities; Learning Ma-
chines; Complex Adaptive Systems
1. Introduction
There is an analogy between machine-learning systems and economic entities
(such as corporations) in that they are both adaptive, and their behaviour is spec-
ified in a more-or-less explicit way. That is, they both seek to optimise something
(like profit, rewards, or some other measure of performance), and they often do
so under some set of constraints. The pressure that is exerted on these adaptive
systems may be specified by precise rules, such as explicit laws and regulations in
the economic case, or constraints on parameters and outputs in the case of learn-
ing machines—e.g., that output probabilities must be between 0 and 1. However,
these constraints may also be implemented in terms of more implicit pressures. For
example, an imperative to maximise profit or rewards constrains the action space
implicitly, since an entity tries to act in a way that avoids poor outcomes. In this
latter case, there are significantly more degrees of freedom that may be allowed,
since it is not explicitly specified how such an objective is achieved.
It would appear that the area of artificial intelligence (AI) that is most analogous
to the behaviour of economic entities is that of morally good decision-making: if
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an economic or machine-learning system is to achieve its goals (maximising some
reward), we want it to do so while acting in a way that is consistent with human
social norms and moral principles. Unfortunately, it is not easy to formally specify a
set of rules or a quantifiable objective which characterises morally good behaviour.
In machine learning, it is thus an open question as to how precisely moral be-
haviour can be achieved in an AI system. Part of the problem lies in the fact that,
even though humans have tried for a long time, we have not come up with a simple
set of programmable rules (constraints) or objectives (such as measurable rewards)
with which to provide these systems in the first place. We argue that the resulting
mismatch between the behaviour of an entity governed by formal specifications and
social norms becomes all the more serious as we consider more powerful entities,
such as large multinational corporations or increasingly powerful AI systems. The
choices made by these systems may end up being misaligned with society’s interests,
and the increasing power of these entities could lead to great havoc, on a larger
scale, as these technologies or corporate entities are further integrated into society.
Our main claim in this paper is that, by opposition to rule-based systems, the
success of deep learning for AI, along with some of the mathematical hypotheses for
this success, suggests that more implicit specifications work better (i.e., are more
effective) than explicit ones based on hard rules for representing the kind of com-
plex behaviour needed to align with human morality. We suggest that it is a logical
consequence of optimising a reward (like profit) under some set of constraints that
leads to border-solutions which touch precisely upon the boundary of one or more
of those constraints (like laws)—this consequence is an artefact of the more ex-
tensive system in which these entities operate. As such, it should be unsurprising,
given that the goals of these entities may be formalised as an optimisation problem,
that they should find solutions that are on the boundary of the permissible action
space. In the case of economic entities, constraints are often provided in the form of
explicit laws, meaning that it should be unsurprising when such entities converge
on solutions which are precisely on the border of what is legal. This has the further
consequence that small perturbations in such a dynamical system or imperfect spec-
ification of laws may well lead to genuinely immoral or otherwise harmful actions,
and this would be true both for AI systems and for corporations. Furthermore,
as the dimensionality of the action space of these entities increases, we use deep
learning theory to argue that it becomes more difficult to approximate a principled
objective (like ‘do no harm’) with a set of rule-like constraints since the size of the
required set increases (possibly exponentially), along with an increase in opportuni-
ties for misspecification and misalignment between the optimised behaviour of the
entity and the intended objective.
If the above suggestion is correct—i.e., that there is an analogy between machine-
learning systems and economic entities—then our main claim implies that a regu-
latory and fiscal environment which provides more implicit pressures on economic
entities will lead to their behaviour being more aligned with a common good. Cur-
rently, the best-known way to achieve such implicit pressure is via legal or regulatory
principles (by opposition to explicit rules) which can be evaluated by human be-
ings, who hold in their head some representation of their version of what is morally
acceptable according to the stated principles.
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To show that this implication is plausible, this paper has two main objectives.
First, we must make explicit the assumptions that underlie our main claim, which
we clearly formulate, thus.
Main Claim:
The success of deep learning for AI and its theoretical grounding
suggests that more implicit specifications are better than explicit
ones for representing complex functions of the kind which human
brains can represent intuitively but that are not easily reducible to
a few formal rules.
We will refer back to this claim throughout the paper. Furthermore, when there is
a mismatch between the desired morality function and a set of rule-like constraints
meant to approximate it, optimising a reward (like profit) under these constraints
will lead to borderline solutions which tend to fail the test of morality. To make
explicit what would be required for our main claim to be true, we must (1) discuss
optimisation problems, (2) explain how deep learning has been more successful than
traditional techniques in solving such problems, and (3) clarify how constraints are
implicit in this domain. This is the goal of Section 2. In Section 2.1, we begin our
analysis by offering a brief overview of the mechanics of optimisation problems,
which further provides some technical background for our audience outside of the
machine-learning community. In Section 2.2, we make clear in what ways deep
learning is successful as compared with traditional machine-learning techniques. In
Section 2.3, we discuss the distinction between explicit constraints in traditional
methods and implicit constraints in deep learning.
Once the truth of our main claim has been established, we draw the following
conclusion: given the close analogy between machine-learning systems and economic
entities, more implicit specifications (or specifications that are more implicit) and
less explicit rules (or fewer rules that are explicit) may also be more successful for
economic entities to achieve their goals. We will refer to this as our hypothetical
analogy. To assert that the hypothetical analogy is plausible, it is necessary to clar-
ify the similarity between machine-learning systems and economic entities. This is
the goal of Section 3. This implication takes the form of an analogical argument.
Therefore, in Section 3.1, we discuss analogies in general, and what it takes for an
analogical argument to be strong. In Section 3.2, we review some literature from
economics in the forward direction of our analogy; it is well-accepted that solu-
tions in economics can help to inform machine learning. The principal contribution
of our paper is given in Section 3.3, where we discuss the backward direction of
the analogy—namely, that results from machine learning may inform policies in
economics and social organisation in general.
The main theoretical result of this analogy is that implicit specifications may
be more well-suited for finding solutions which are both optimal and beneficial.
However, this has the immediate consequence that we must give a clear statement
of implicit specifications to move toward practical progress in this domain. The
plausibility of this is discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we offer some
examples of how this view may proceed in terms of implementation, thus paving
the way for future research to build upon this framework.
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2. Assumptions
In this section, we (1) discuss optimisation problems, (2) explain how deep learn-
ing has been more successful than traditional techniques in solving such problems
and explicate some of the relevant theoretical analyses, and (3) clarify how con-
straints are implicit in the deep-learning domain. Making these three things explicit
should be sufficient for the truth of our main claim: that the success of deep learning
for AI suggests that more implicit specifications are better than explicit ones for
solving optimisation problems under the implicit constraint of acting morally.
2.1. On Optimisation Problems. The vast majority of machine-learning al-
gorithms train models and perform inference by solving optimisation problems
(Murphy, 2012; Goodfellow et al., 2016). In mathematics and computer science,
an optimisation problem involves finding the best solution from the set of all (feasi-
ble) solutions. More specifically, given a metric, P, the solution to an optimisation
problem consists in finding a function (or the parameters of a function) within
a given set (of feasible or acceptable solutions) that maximises (minimises) this
metric. In machine learning, this metric is usually an average on some data or an
expectation over a distribution. Optimisation problems are ubiquitous in applied
mathematics, and methods for solving such problems are essential for many different
fields, including manufacturing and production, inventory control, transportation,
scheduling, finance, marketing, engineering and control, mechanics, economics, and
policy modelling, to name a few (Nocedal and Wright, 2006).
A typical optimisation problem consists of an objective function, R(x), which
gives the quantity to be maximised (e.g. a reward); a set of variables, {x1, x2, x3, . . .} =
{xn}, which can be set by an agent and constitute the inputs for the objective func-
tion; and a set of equality constraints, {hn(x)}, or inequality constraints, {gn(x)},
which limit the possible values for the variables.1
Convex optimisation problems are standard in computer science, and many
classes of convex optimisation problems admit polynomial-time algorithms (Nesterov and Nemirovskii,
1994), though mathematical optimisation generally is NP-hard (Sahni, 1974; Murty and Kabadi,
1987; Pardalos and Vavasis, 1991).2 Indeed, while many non-convex optimisation
problems are NP-hard to solve optimally, there is a range of such problems that
are known to be NP-hard to solve approximately, as well (Meka et al., 2008). The
standard form of a convex optimisation problem can be written as follows:
(1)
maximise
x
R(x)
subject to gi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . .m
hi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . p
1Of course, this is a gross simplification: some problems may not have constraints; there may be
one or many variables, which are discrete or continuous; optimisation problems themselves may
be static or dynamic, equations may be linear or nonlinear, and systems may be deterministic or
stochastic.
2In complexity theory, a decision problem can be understood as a problem with a yes or no answer.
P is the complexity class denoting the set of all such decision problems that can be decided in
polynomial time; for example, many mathematical operations, such as addition and subtraction,
can be computed in polynomial time. NP is the class denoting the set of problems where proofs
of a positive solution (a ‘yes’ answer to the decision problem) can be verified in polynomial time.
NP-Hard is the class of decision problems that are as difficult as any NP problem to solve. For
example, the Halting Problem is NP-Hard.
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Here, x ∈ Rn is the vector of optimisation variables, the functions R, g1, . . . , gm
are convex, and the functions h1, . . . , hp are affine. The feasible set for R is the
set of points x ∈ Rn satisfying all of the constraints, g1 ≤ 0, . . . , gm ≤ 0, h1 =
0, . . . , hp = 0 (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004). Importantly, the optimal solutions
of an optimisation problem can occur at every point of the intersection between the
domain of the objective function and the set of constraints on the cost function.
Two important theorems in linear programming are given as follows:
Theorem 2.1: For a polyhedron P and a point x ∈ P , the following are
equivalent:
(1) x is a vertex of P ,
(2) x is an extreme point of P , and
(3) x is a basic feasible solution.
Theorem 2.2: Any bounded LP in standard form has an optimum at a
basic feasible solution.
Therefore, it follows straightforwardly for this case that it is a logical consequence
of placing explicit constraints on (this particular class of) optimisation problems,
that solutions will live on the boundary of those constraints. Though this is not
true in the general case (e.g., non-convex optimisation problems may have solutions
in the interior of the feasible set), the point being made here is still illustrative
because (1) some approaches to non-convex optimisation use special formulations of
linear programming, and (2) many non-convex optimisation are solved in practice
by reducing the problem into a convex optimisation problem and then finding a
solution for that problem (which then approximates the solution to the original
problem).
In the economic case, the constraints are given by society in the form of regula-
tions, laws, etc. We have illustrated, via formal consequences, that placing explicit
constraints on an action space implies that an optimising agent will find a solution
on the boundary of those constraints. The same conclusion can be shown intuitively
by the following thought experiment. Consider a typical profit-maximising corpo-
ration whose behaviour is explicitly constrained by laws and regulations. Assume
further that this corporation is acting optimally, in the sense of maximising its
profit. Is it possible for such an entity to increase its profit by removing some of
those constraints? If the answer to this question is ‘yes’, then this implies that the
corporation’s optimal profit-maximising solution lived on the border of at least one
of the (legal or regulatory) constraints imposed on its action space. Furthermore,
the lobbying efforts of larger corporations to relax or remove particular laws or
regulations provide strong evidence that the answer to this question is, in fact,
‘yes’.
2.2. The Successes of Deep Learning. Machine learning is a branch of artificial
intelligence that primarily involves designing algorithms which can be used to learn
from data or interactions with their environment. A standard definition of machine
learning is given by Mitchell (1997):
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a computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect
to some class of tasks T and performance measure P if its perfor-
mance at tasks in T , as measured by P , improves with experience
E. (2)
In essence, a machine-learning algorithm builds a mathematical model based on
structured sample (training) data, to make predictions or decisions in novel con-
texts, without being explicitly programmed to perform that task (Koza et al., 1996;
Bishop, 1996). This is often achieved by approximate optimisation of an objective
function, which typically measures how well the learner performs on a set of data
or experiences.
Deep learning is a subset of machine learning whose algorithms are loosely in-
spired by brains (both neuroscience and cognitive science), where artificial neural
networks perform the computations. A distinguishing feature of deep learning is
its emphasis on learning internal representations, thus relying less on hand-crafted
features or attributes. This makes possible the ability to learn from raw data, like
images or sounds: ‘[d]eep learning algorithms seek to exploit the unknown structure
in the input distribution in order to discover good representations, often at multi-
ple levels, with higher-level learned features defined in terms of lower-level features’
(Bengio, 2012, p. 17).
Deep learning, as a form of machine learning, has seen great successes in the last
decade. Salient examples of this are in computer vision, speech recognition, machine
translation and playing games (and beating the world champions at games like
Go). Deep learning’s successes can be attributed to its ability to capture complex
functions, which are not generally easy to represent as a small set of rules. This
ability captures a form of intuitive knowledge which humans typically have but
can hardly express verbally, much less program in computers. This is in contrast
with earlier approaches to artificial intelligence (such as expert systems and rule-
based systems) which relied on formalising knowledge expressed by humans. These
earlier approaches work well when the domain of knowledge considered can be well
described in a set of clear and specific rules which one can thus program into a
computer.
Lewis-Kraus (2016) highlights the progress brought by deep learning in machine
translation with the following illustrative example. The opening of Ernest Heming-
way’s short story, ‘The Snows of Kilimanjaro’ proceeds thus:
Original English Text:
Kilimanjaro is a snow-covered mountain 19,710 feet high, and is
said to be the highest mountain in Africa.. . . Close to the western
summit there is the dried and frozen carcass of a leopard. No one
has explained what the leopard was seeking at that altitude.
Translating the Japanese version of this text back into English using Google Trans-
late’s statistical machine-translation methods, we obtain the following.
(A) Machine Translation (Pre-Deep Learning):
Kilimanjaro is 19,710 feet of the mountain covered with snow, and
it is said that the highest mountain in Africa.. . . The top close to
the west, there is a dry, frozen carcass of a leopard. Whether the
leopard had what the demand at that altitude, there is no that
nobody explained.
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However, after Google rolled out its deep-learning methods, the output is as follows.
(B) Machine Translation (Post-Deep Learning):
Kilimanjaro is a mountain of 19,710 feet covered with snow and is
said to be the highest mountain in Africa.. . . Near the top of the
west there is a dry and frozen dead body of leopard. No one has
ever explained what leopard wanted at that altitude.
Lewis-Kraus (2016) highlights that save for a missing article in the deep-learning
translation, it is almost indistinguishable from a human translation. Though it took
approximately 13 months to implement, from the user’s point of view, the change
from (A) to (B) happened overnight.
In addition to this particular example, deep learning has seen great success over
traditional techniques in many applications, including computer vision (O’Mahony et al.,
2019), speech/audio/image recognition (Lee et al., 2009; Ngiam et al., 2011; Mroueh et al.,
2015; Wu et al., 2015; Amodei et al., 2016; Prasad et al., 2020), natural language
processing (Collobert and Weston, 2008; Young et al., 2018), social network fil-
tering (Xie et al., 2018) and spam detection (Zheng et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2017;
Barushka and Ha´jek, 2018), machine translation (Wu et al., 2016; Vaswani et al.,
2018), bioinformatics (Chen et al., 2016; Min et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019), drug de-
sign (Gawehn et al., 2016; Jing et al., 2018), medical image analysis (Litjens et al.,
2017; Shen et al., 2017), game playing (Mnih et al., 2013, 2015; Silver et al., 2016,
2017, 2018), etc. In these and many other fields of application, deep-learning algo-
rithms produce results that are substantially better than previous state-of-the-art,
sometimes approaching or surpassing human performance.
2.3. Explicit and Implicit Knowledge. Many of the best state-of-the-art neural
network architectures rely on a particular form of nonlinearity in each of the artifi-
cial neurons: piecewise-linearity (i.e. formed by the concatenation of linear pieces).
The use of these rectifying nonlinearities was inspired by neuroscience and shown
experimentally to make it easier to train deeper neural networks (Glorot et al.,
2011). An interesting theoretical feature of these networks makes their analysis eas-
ier: the overall function (from inputs to outputs) computed by such deep networks
is piecewise-linear. This means that there exists a set of linear constraints which can
be combined logically to represent precisely the same function as that computed by
one of these deep networks.
However, it has been demonstrated that the number of such linear pieces (i.e.,
the rules that would obtain if we were to translate the network into a set of rules)
grows exponentially both with the number of artificial neurons per layer and with
the number of layers (Montufar et al., 2014). In other words, deep neural networks
cannot be well represented by a reasonably small set of rules. This is consistent
with the notion that complex, intuitive knowledge is not easily expressed in a small
set of verbally expressible rules (i.e., where each rule involves a simple relationship
between a few variables). Whereas a deep neural network thus captures implicit
knowledge (difficult or impossible to express explicitly via a small set of rules),
classical symbolic AI approaches relied on humans expressing explicit knowledge,
which can be formalised into a set of rules.
What is strongly suggested by these theoretical results, in conjunction with the
empirical success of deep learning on tasks involving implicit and intuitive knowl-
edge, is the following: trying to capture intuitive and implicit knowledge in an
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explicit way (the rule-based approach) runs the risk of a substantial gap between
that implicit knowledge and the function represented by rule-like constraints. The
‘size’ of that gap can be measured by the remarkable improvement which has been
achieved when going from rule-based AI to deep learning on a broad set of tasks
which precisely resist straightforward formalisation (like computer vision, speech
recognition, machine translation, or playing the game of Go).
Having established this foundation, we move on to fleshing out the analogy be-
tween machine-learning systems and economic entities in the next section.
3. Analogies
The hypothetical analogy—implicit specifications may also be more successful
for economic entities to achieve their goals—is a consequence of our main claim
(elucidated in the previous section) and the fact that machine-learning systems and
economic systems are analogous. This implication takes the form of an analogical
argument. Therefore, to establish the strength of our hypothetical analogy, we must
specify how machine-learning systems and economic entities are analogous. In this
section, we begin by describing the formal components of analogies and analogical
reasoning (Section 3.1), before providing some evidence for the strength of this
analogy (Section 3.2), and finally drawing our main conclusions (Section 3.3).
3.1. The Structure of an Analogical Argument. An analogy is a comparison
of the apparent similarity between two objects or systems of objects. Analogical
reasoning is a form of reasoning that takes advantage of such apparent similarity.
Following Hesse (1966), we can distinguish between horizontal and vertical relations
in an analogy. Horizontal relations are similarity (and difference) relations between
domains, whereas vertical relations involve correspondence between objects, prop-
erties, and relations within a domain. Following Keynes (1921), we can further
distinguish between a positive analogy and a negative analogy:
Definition 3.1: Positive Analogy
Let P = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set [or ‘list’] of accepted propositions about
the source domain, S. Let P ∗ = {P ∗1 , . . . , P
∗
n} be a set of corresponding
propositions, which are all accepted as holding of the target domain, T . P
and P ∗ represent accepted (or known) similarities. We refer to P as the
positive analogy.
Definition 3.2: Negative Analogy
Let A = {A1, . . . , Ar} be a set [or ‘list’] of propositions that are accepted
as holding in S, and let B∗ = {B∗1 , . . . , B
∗
s} be a set of propositions holding
in T . Suppose the analogous propositions A∗ = {A∗1, . . . , A
∗
n} fail to hold in
T , and the propositions B = {B1, . . . , Bn} fail to hold in S. We can write
A,¬A∗ and ¬B,B∗ to represent accepted or known differences and refer to
A and B as the negative analogy.
Definition 3.3: Neutral Analogy
The neutral analogy consists of accepted propositions about S for which it
is not known whether an analogue, Q∗, holds in T .
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Definition 3.4: Hypothetical Analogy
The hypothetical analogy is the proposition, Q∗, in the neutral analogy that
is the focus of our attention.
A standard way to understand an analogy is as a mapping of structures (Gentner and Gentner,
1983).3 On their view, analogies take advantage of ‘certain aspects of existing knowl-
edge, and that this selected knowledge can be structurally characterized’ (p. 101).4
A comparison of two complex concepts by analogy takes advantage of relations be-
tween the constituent parts of the complex concept, but does not require that any
two objects in that domain are similar. Good analogies are supposed to be charac-
terised, on this view, by systematic relational correspondences: these are ‘[a]nalogies
are about relations, rather than simple features. No matter what kind of knowl-
edge (causal models, plans, stories, etc.), it is the structural properties (i.e., the
interrelationships between the facts) that determine the content of an analogy’
(Falkenhainer et al., 1989, p. 3).5
An analogical argument is an explicit representation of analogical reasoning,
which depends upon cited similarities between the objects or systems in question,
and which supports the (explicit) conclusion that some further similarity exists.
An analogical argument is inductive to the extent that the analogy, upon which
the argument depends, makes the argument’s conclusion plausible (in the sense of
enhancing its probability).
In analogical reasoning, there is a noted similarity between a source domain and
a target domain. The analogy comes into play when noting some property or set of
properties, Q (the neutral analogy) in the source and reasoning that the property,
Q, or some similar property, Q∗ (the hypothetical analogy), holds in the target
(Keynes, 1921). Therefore, given that the source and target contexts share some
relevant structural properties, it is plausible that the target context also contains
some other property which obtains in the source. Bartha (2016) enumerates the
following general ‘commonsense’ guidelines for the strength of analogical reasoning:6
(1) The more similarities (between two domains), the stronger the analogy;
similarly, the more differences, the weaker the analogy.
(2) The more differences, the weaker the analogy.
(3) The greater the extent of our ignorance about the two domains, the weaker
the analogy.
(4) The weaker the conclusion, the more plausible the analogy.
(5) Analogies involving causal relations are more plausible than those not in-
volving causal relations.
(6) Structural analogies are stronger than those based on superficial similari-
ties.
(7) The relevance of the similarities and differences to the conclusion (i.e., to
the hypothetical analogy) must be taken into account.
3Technically, a model-theoretic isomorphism.
4See also Gentner (1983); Gick and Holyoak (1983); Holyoak and Thagard (1989, 1995);
Forbus et al. (1994, 1995); Forbus (2001); Gentner et al. (2001); Dunbar (2001).
5Though, see Schlimm (2008).
6See also Mill (1843); Keynes (1921); Robinson (1930); Stebbing (1933); Moore and Parker
(1998); Woods et al. (2004); Copi and Cohen (2005). Alternative guidelines are given in Aristotle
(1984a,b,c) and Hesse (1966). See also Hume (1779); Quine and Ullian (1970).
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(8) Multiple analogies supporting the same conclusion make the argument
stronger.
Bartha (2010) notes that an analogical argument has the form: ‘[i]t is plausible
that Q∗ holds in the target because of certain known (or accepted) similarities with
the source domain, despite certain known (or accepted) differences’ (15). Here,
plausibility might be simply interpreted as prima facie plausibility. Furthermore,
to say an hypothesis is prima facie plausible is to say only that (1) it has epistemic
support, and (2) it has pragmatic importance. The first of these simply requires an
appreciable likelihood of being true (or successful).
We said in the introduction that there is an analogy between machine-learning
systems and economic entities in that they are both adaptive, and their behaviour
is specified in a more-or-less explicit way. With this formal framework laid out, we
are now in a position to assess the strength of this analogy. If the analogy holds
and is strong, then a clearer understanding of it may help us forward, both in the
socio-economic domain and in the AI domain. That is,
⇒ Known results in economics may help inform feasible solutions in AI safety;
but also,
⇐ known results in AI may inform economic policy (with respect to, e.g.,
regulation).
The next section (3.2) discusses the forward direction by appealing to work in
economics that has suggested places where the socio-economic domain may help to
inform solutions in AI safety.
3.2. The Forward Direction. Here, we consider current work in the Economics
literature on the forward direction of our analogy. This should give some prima facie
plausibility to the strength of the analogy, thus making the backward direction (and
in particular, our hypothetical analogy) more plausible.
To design an AI agent, we must first specify what we want it to do. In reinforce-
ment learning, for example, this consists in defining a reward function which tells the
agent the value of all state and action combinations. When an algorithm does well
at learning, this means that it performs well with respect to this reward function. In
some cases, specifying a reward function may be relatively straightforward—e.g., a
win in a game of chess consists of a +1 reward, a loss −1, and a draw 0.
However, in real-world situations, it is often unclear how the reward function
should be specified. This leads to the alignment problem: an artificial system is
aligned (i.e., with human goals) just in case it reliably or accurately implements
human values. This involves, on the design end, ensuring that the objective given
to the AI system is an accurate representation of the intended objective. Alignment
becomes a problem when there are differences between the specified reward function
and what relevant features/actions human actually value. The alignment problem
comes in many different forms and may include, e.g., negative (unintended) side-
effects, reward hacking, limited capacity for human oversight, differences between
training and deployment environments, uncontrolled or unexpected exploration af-
ter deployment. Misalignment may arise because of the fundamental difficulty in
representing and implementing human values—problems of fairness and bias in
machine learning algorithms are fundamentally problems of alignment.
Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) suggest that the AI alignment problem has
a clear analogue in the human principle-agent problem, which has been long-studied
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by economists and legal scholars. In the principal-agent problem, a human agent is
tasked with taking actions that achieve a principal’s objective. Ideally, alignment
is achieved through what is called a complete contingent contract. Such a contract
perfectly aligns the agent’s incentives with the principal’s objective in a a theoreti-
cally enforceable way (by, e.g., monetary transfers or punishments, social sanctions,
etc.), and which specifies the reward received by the agent for all possible actions
and states of the world—i.e., such a contract altogether accounts for every possible
contingency.
Economists initially modelled this problem by assuming that the principal agent
could simply fine-tune the agent’s incentives on everything that she cared about—
this is quite analogous to the machine learning problem of designing objective func-
tions to accommodate everything that we care about.7 However, in practice, it turns
out to be challenging to design reward functions for many tasks which we would like
AI agents to perform. This difficulty also arises in the economic sphere: contracts
constructed in this way end up being complex and strange (Hadfield, 2019, p. 4).
Furthermore, writing such a contract is routinely impossible since states of the
world may be non-contractible (because they are unobservable or unverifiable and
because the number of possible states of the world is enormous for all but trivial
domains. Further still, human agents are boundedly rational, so they may not be
able to evaluate the optimal actions in all states of the world, and they may not
even be able to predict or imagine all the possible states of the world. (Similarly,
it may be impossible to unambiguously describe every contingency.) Even if these
problems are ignored, it may be too costly (either financially, temporally, or compu-
tationally) to write every contingency down in a way that can also be enforced at a
reasonable cost. Therefore, Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) highlight that con-
tracts in human relationships are usually, if not necessarily, incomplete.8 It follows
that not all of the expectations arising from a formal contract will be documented.
As a result, it is crucial to understand the level of, e.g., detail (Mayer and Argyres,
2004) or complexity (Reuer and Arin˜o, 2007) that a contract needs to employ to
be effective.
But this is precisely the alignment problem in artificial intelligence systems.
The alignment problem is analogous to issues in economics and law surrounding
incomplete contracts (Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield, 2019). It will be impossible for
an employer to be able to incentivise their (new) employee on every dimension of a
job that they care about; so, one must accept that in delegating a task to another
agent, it may not be done exactly in the way that one wants. Hadfield (2019)
suggests that the principle-agent problem underlies everything from employment
to democracy. Similarly, we design AI systems to perform tasks of interest, but
we want to ensure that the solutions that they do find are ones that are aligned
with our own goals and values. Thus, we must design these systems in a way that
avoids unwanted or unanticipated solutions, without epistemic access to what those
solutions might be in advance.
Incomplete contracts are analogous to (potentially) misspecified rewards in the
following sense. The former involve bounded rationality, costly cognition/drafting,
possible non-contractibility, planned renegotiation, planned completion by a third
7See discussion in Russell (2019).
8See also Simon (1982); Grossman and Hart (1986); Williamson (1996); Bernheim and Whinston
(1998); Graebner (2009).
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party in the event of a dispute, and (negative) strategic behaviour on the part of
the agent. The latter has parallel features, including bounded rationality, costly en-
gineering/design, possible non-implementability, planned iteration on reward func-
tions, expected completion by a third party, and adversarial blinding or reward
preservation.
Contracts are often used to align expectations (Macaulay, 1963; Argyres et al.,
2007); however, contracts are also often violated (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994).
The two dominant theoretical perspectives on the nature of contracts understand
contracts as instruments of control (Macneil, 1977; Williamson, 1985, 1991) and
instruments of coordination (Argyres et al., 2007; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). In
light of this, Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) suggest that
AI designers, like contract designers, are faced with the challenge of
achieving intended goals in light of the limitations that arise from
translating those goals into implementable structures to guide agent
behavior (learning algorithms and reward functions). An AI is mis-
aligned whenever it chooses behaviors based on a reward function
that is different from the true welfare of relevant humans. (p. 3)
Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) posit that an analysis of incomplete contract-
ing in economics and law provides a useful framework for discussing the alignment
problem in an AI context—extant technical results in formal economics may pro-
vide a way forward for AI researchers. Importantly, however, this ‘is supported by
substantial amounts of external structure, such as generally available institutions
(culture, law) that can supply implied terms to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts’
(p. 2).
Thus, Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield (2019) take the alignment problem for AI
and incomplete contracts as analogous to argue for the hypothetical analogy that
solving the alignment problem will inevitably require building formal tools that
allow AI systems to take into account the costs associated with taking actions
deemed wrongful by human communities when they evaluate their rewards—i.e.,
this will require figuring the normative structures of human communities. This is
drawn from the neutral analogy of incomplete contracting in economic systems.
In the next section, we look toward the opposite direction, making explicit the
positive, neutral, and hypothetical analogies between AI systems and economic
entities more generally, and assessing explicitly the analogical argument that we
are putting forward.
3.3. The Backward Direction (The Hypothetical Analogy). We suggested
in the introduction that there is an analogy between economic entities and machine
learning entities and that the most analogous feature of these separate systems is in
the realm of morally good decision making. We make the positive and hypothetical
analogies between these two systems explicit in Table 1.
As mentioned in the introduction, our purpose is to argue for the hypothetical
analogy, Q∗. Thus, our argument explicitly takes the following form: given the
strength of the analogy between machine learning systems and economic systems
(as specified by P1-P3), and given that Q holds in the source domain, it is plausible
that Q∗ holds in the target domain.
We suggest, following the commonsense criteria laid out by Bartha (2016), that
this inductive argument is strong. On the one hand, there are many similarities
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Machine Learning Systems
(Source Domain)
Economic Systems
(Target Domain)
P1 ML systems are complex adaptive en-
tities.
• They seek to optimise some re-
ward
• Their behaviour is implicitly
specified as the result of optimis-
ing the reward (under the con-
straints of their architecture and
computational limitations)
• Their actions are subject to con-
straints, which may be explicit
or implicit
P ∗
1
Economic agents are complex adap-
tive entities.
• They seek to optimise some re-
ward
• Their behaviour is implicitly
specified as the result of ap-
proximately optimising the re-
ward while satisfying legal con-
straints.
• Their actions are subject to con-
strains, which may be explicit or
implicit
P2 Ideal actions should be beneficial to
society as a whole.
P3 Alignment problem
• Bounded rationality
• Costly engineering/design
• Non-implementability
• Planned iteration on rewards
• Planned completion by third
party (such as fine-tuning in
light of new data / new tasks)
• Adversarial blinding
...
Q More implicit specifications work bet-
ter than explicit ones for solving opti-
misation problems in ML systems.
P ∗
2
Ideal actions should be beneficial to
society as a whole.
P ∗
3
Principal-agent problem
• Bounded rationality
• Costly cognition/drafting
• Non-contractibility
• Planned renegotiation
• Planned completion by third
party
• Strategic behaviour
...
Q∗ More implicit specifications are better
than explicit ones for solving optimi-
sation problems in economic systems.
Table 1. Positive and hypothetical analogy between machine-
learning systems and economic systems
between the source and target domains. Furthermore, the conclusion, Q∗, is a rela-
tively weak claim—it does not give particular specifications as to what the implicit
rules consist in, for example. We hold that the similarities between these two sys-
tems are structural and not superficial and the similarities between these systems
are relevant to our hypothetical analogy; however, Bartha (2016) notes that it is
not clear why structural and causal analogies are taken as especially important, nor
which structural or causal features merit attention.
We have neither enumerated every possible positive analogy between these two
systems, nor any negative analogy between them; nonetheless, our purpose to this
point was to make clear some of the analogous features of these two systems
to provide evidence that the analogy holds. In this sense, the conclusion of our
argument—the hypothetical analogy—is at least plausible. In the next section, we
discuss whether or not this conclusion is practical.
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4. Are Implicit Rules Practical?
The success of deep learning for a broad set of AI tasks (by implicitly telling the
AI what to do via an empirical objective to be optimised), compared to classical
rule-based AI (for which constraints are very explicit and clearly defined), suggests
that more implicit specifications work better for those tasks which humans do pri-
marily via intuition—i.e., those belonging to what Kahneman (2011) calls System
1 abilities. Part of the reason for this discrepancy is that deep learning systems are
optimised (rather than hand-crafted). Another such reason—consistent with the
theoretical result outlined above from Montufar et al. (2014)—is that the compu-
tations required for performing well at such intuitive tasks involve a mathematical
function living in a very high-dimensional space (requiring a huge number of pa-
rameters). Therefore, to specify the acceptable behaviour of one of these entities
using only explicit rules, one would require a massive number of rules; whereas,
maximising an objective function in a rich function space, as captured by deep
networks, can be done with comparatively fewer degrees of freedom.
In Section 2, we clarified the assumptions that went into our main claim: that the
successes of deep learning imply that more implicit specifications work better than
explicit ones for solving optimisation problems involving functions which can hardly
be reduced by a manageable set of clear formal rules—i.e., the kind of function that
would be required to identify morally-good conduct. In Section 3, we provided the
formal framework for our argument that there is an analogy between machine-
learning systems and economic entities, and we specified some of the considerations
that lend strength to this analogy. These two points taken together appear to imply
our hypothetical analogy: that more implicit specifications should work better than
explicit ones for achieving moral behaviour in economic entities—i.e., leading to
their behaviour being more aligned with the common good.
Explicit rules in economic systems take the form of clearly specified laws and
regulations which constrain permissible actions. Law is the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules. As Hadfield (2017) highlights, rules
‘provide the structure on which choices and interactions are built’ (p. 5). Thus, the
law has in place its own ‘meta-rules’ for how the rules ought to be interpreted—
this comes in the form of an authoritative figure (e.g., the supreme court, the law-
speaker, a judge, etc.). The mutual recognition of an authoritative way of resolving
‘tough calls’ to answer whether someone has violated the rules is a crucial way
in which law differs from implicit rules. Humans are needed to interpret the rules
precisely when they are not sufficiently clear; however, we argue that this may be
a strength of such implicit rules rather than a weakness, in that it would make it
more difficult for an economic agent to find loopholes in the law when the law relies
more on implicit rules or principles than on formal and precise rules. The downside
is that rule verification requires human brains with judgement and cannot be easily
reduced to programmatic statements that can be checked mechanically.
Implicit rules might take the form of social norms and conventions, as opposed
to explicit laws.9 Or, they might take the form of explicit laws which afford some
9Much has been written in philosophy on social norms and conventions. Though we do not have
space to do the literature justice here, see Lewis (1969); Ullmann-Margalit (1977); Schelling (1978);
Coleman (1990); Vanderschraaf (1995); Bicchieri (2006); Young (1998); Posner (1998, 2000); Voss
(2001); Verbeek (2002); Southwood and Ariksson (2011).
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degree of freedom in terms of interpretability. In theory, laws have many signifi-
cant benefits over social norms or conventions. However, in practice, these benefits
are often not instantiated. For example, laws make it possible to quickly change
rules, whereas social conventions often take time to ‘drift’ via cultural evolution.
In practice, though, it is often extremely difficult to change laws because of the
inherent complexity of the system in which they are couched and the inefficiency
or corruption of the governing bodies who can do so: Hadfield (2019) highlights,
for example, that American ‘bar associations in the early twentieth century built a
constitutional castle around the provision of legal work and established lawyers as
the gatekeepers’ (p. 11).
Similarly problematic is the fact that current legal infrastructure in developed
countries is often grossly outdated (in the digital era), complex, and slow to change,
while in developing countries, this infrastructure is often nonexistent. The purpose
of a legal framework is supposed to be to protect the freedom and autonomy of
individuals (i.e., to benefit society as a whole); however, though these rules and
systems of rules should be produced in a way that is of a more significant benefit to
humankind, there are often not produced in such a way. Similarly, legal infrastruc-
ture often relies heavily on centralised planning, so that regulation is something
that is produced solely by politicians, policymakers, and civil servants (Hadfield,
2019, p. 246).
Of course, one might worry that we are suggesting doing away with laws al-
together and that this suggestion has inherently problematic consequences. The
purpose of this section is to highlight the possibility of using more implicit rules
relying on human judgement, by examining several real-world cases which we take
to be indicative of implicit versus explicit rules in practice. These three cases are
(1) distinguishing the letter and the spirit of the law, (2) shareholder theory versus
stakeholder theory in a corporate legal framework, and (3) rule-based and principle-
based accounting principles for economic entities.
4.1. Example 1: The Letter and the Spirit of the Law. One way of distin-
guishing the letter and spirit of the law is whether expectation between parties is
explicitly documented. The letter of the law—litera legis (Garner, 2009)—represents
the explicitly documented expectations; thus, the letter of the law stands for the
formal boundary between legal and illegal actions. In contrast, the spirit includes
the undocumented (or tacitly held) expectations (Harmon et al., 2014), represent-
ing the law’s ‘general meaning or purpose, as opposed to its literal content’ (Garner,
2009). To put it in a slightly different way, the letter of the law is its literal mean-
ing, whereas the spirit is its perceived intention (Garcia et al., 2014), which requires
human judgement to be identified.10 In any case, it should be clear that the spirit
of the law is an inherently normative concept.
Violations of the letter of the law might be understood as the failure to fulfil
a clear, documented expectation expressed in the contract; whereas, violations of
the spirit of law include failures to fulfil an undocumented (though, by assump-
tion tacitly agreed upon) expectation. Harmon et al. (2014) discuss how parties are
likely to react when contract violations occur. In particular, they find that letter
10There are other ways that the spirit of law is defined; for example, Ostas (2004) prioritises
the fundamental rules underlying the social and ethical values protected (or supposed to be pro-
tected) by the letter of the law; Finkel (1995, 1999) understands the spirit of the law in terms of
‘commonsense justice’, understood in terms of what the law ought to be (p. 669).
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violations are more difficult to overcome than spirit violations—perhaps due to
perceived intentionality.
Sometimes, breaking the letter of the law can be relatively inert. For example,
though the posted speed limit on highways in Canada gives an explicit, hard rule
between driving the legal speed and speeding (doing something illegal), it is a con-
vention that it is acceptable to drive approximately 10 km per hour faster than the
posted speed limit. Thus, the letter of the law on a particular stretch of the Trans-
Canada Highway is ‘do not exceed 100 km/h’. The spirit of the law is ‘maintain
a speed of around 100 km/h’. A Canadian may well accept being pulled over for
driving 115 km/h but may feel indignant (and perhaps justifiably-so) if pulled over
for driving 102 km/h.
It is a point of contention in the United States whether the law ought to be
interpreted on account of its letter or its spirit. For example, in American consti-
tutional law, ‘originalist’ or ‘textualist’ legal scholars argue that the constitution
should be interpreted by the letter of what is written since the amendment process
precludes broad interpretation (Easterbrook, 1988; Taylor, 1995). By contrast, in
Canada, the Interpretation Act of 1985 explicitly states that ‘the law shall be con-
sidered. . . according to its true spirit, intent and meaning’. So, implicit rules, in the
form of interpretability of spirit, are the legal standard in Canada.
4.2. Example 2: Shareholder Theory versus Stakeholder Theory. There
are laws in place to protect individuals who have a connection to an economic en-
tity, like a corporation. Shareholders are individuals who have a vested financial
interest in the economic entity, whereas stakeholders include individuals, groups, or
organisations that are impacted by the outcomes of the behaviours of the economic
entity. Thus, given the fact that economic entities seek to maximise something (like
profits) so as to be beneficial, the question is to whom should their actions benefit.
Shareholder theory suggests that economic entities are beholden solely to sharehold-
ers, whereas stakeholder theory suggests that they are also beholden to, perhaps,
the wider public or society. Thus, corporations ought to consider constituents other
than shareholders when making decisions to the extent that ‘all parties work to-
gether for a common goal and obtain shared benefits’ (Reynolds et al., 2006, p.
285).
There is no explicit statute in the United States legally requiring corporations to
maximise profits (or shareholder interests). However, case law sets a clear and un-
ambiguous precedent—The most common reference is to eBay v. Newmark (2010),
which many commentators view as a decisive affirmation that shareholder wealth
maximisation is the sole legally permissible objective of a for-profit corporation
(Boatright, 2017).
Section 122 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act of 1985 instead states
the following:
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122 (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers
and discharging their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of
the corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances.
Thus, it was up for interpretation what was meant by the ‘best interest’ of
the corporation. Canadian law circa the 1980s leaned toward shareholder theory;
however, through the 1990s, there was a paradigm shift in case law that created
some ambiguity about how to interpret this phrase. Two landmark cases set a
definitive precedent for stakeholder theory in Canadian law (Puri, 2010; Alexander,
2012). No longer a mere precedent, on 21 June 2019 the House of Commons passed
Bill C-97, which explicitly clarifies what is meant by ‘best interest’:
(1.1) When acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation un-
der paragraph (1)(a), the directors and officers of the corporation may
consider, but are not limited to, the following factors:
(a) the interests of
(i) shareholders,
(ii) employees,
(iii) retirees and pensioners,
(iv) creditors,
(v) consumers, and
(vi) governments;
(b) the environment; and
(c) the long-term interests of the corporation.
Whereas shareholder interest corresponds to profit maximisation and requires
measuring only profit, which is formally quantifiable, taking into account the above
stakeholders interest is hardly reduced to a simple set of verifiable or quantifiable
values. Instead, they require implicit human judgement and correspond more to
implicit rules or principles.
4.3. Example 3: Rules and Principles. The final example we will consider con-
cerns rules surrounding generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). This is
a common set of rules, principles, standards, and procedures that economic enti-
ties must follow when compiling their financial statements. This provides a set of
accounting guidelines for, e.g., revenue recognition and balance sheet classification.
In an international context, this is referred to as international financial reporting
standards. In the United States, GAAP is rule-based, which means that these prin-
ciples can be acted on without contextualisation. In contrast, GAAP in Canada is
principle-based. Similar to the letter versus the spirit of the law, this means that
there is some room for judgement and flexibility in accounting so that the substance
rather than just the form of a transaction is recorded. The principles, in this sense,
are general by nature and require interpretation—so, their applications may vary
depending on the context.
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These three examples are merely meant to be illustrative of the fact that even
when rules are written down explicitly, they may be open to interpretation. As such,
the content of the rule is more implicit. Rather than implying that laws should be
done away with altogether, this shows one way of understanding the meaning of
the hypothetical analogy which we have been arguing for in this paper—that more
implicit specifications are better than explicit ones for representing rich solutions
to optimisation problems in economic systems. Thus, we take it that this serves as
more than just a theoretical guideline, but one that is also practical and could be
acted upon.
5. Conclusion
We have discussed, in this paper, an analogy between the objects of study in
economics and machine learning—namely, approximately rational agents. We have
seen that, in trying to act rationally, both seek to optimise something. However,
this optimisation process is subject to several possible constraints. The pressure
exerted on these adaptive entities can come in the form of very explicit constraints
or more implicit pressures. Thus, the analogy between economic entities and cor-
porations combined with the recent successes of machine learning algorithms in
performing tasks which require intuitive cognition, along with the observation that
moral behaviour has not been reduced to explicit rules but can be achieved by hu-
man judgement, seem to jointly imply that more implicit specifications work better
than explicit ones for capturing moral behaviour. As such, it appears that a regula-
tory and fiscal environment which provides more implicit pressures on corporations
may lead to their behaviour being more aligned with the common good.
Here is a suggestive example deriving from this analysis. It may be more benefi-
cial, from an economic point of view, to have more of the civil servants be allowed to
exert their own judgement, like judges—i.e., by specifying their objective in a more
implicit (according to high-level principles rather than very precise and explicit
rules). Indeed, when trying to prescribe their behaviour by a set of clear rules (as is
often the case in large organizations and bureaucracies), one obtains more consis-
tent decisions less subject to corruption, but possibly at the price of not efficiently
aligning their behaviour with the social good which is intended. This is consistent
with the common observation that such rules lead to unjust or wasteful decisions.
Pushing the needle towards more self-responsible civil servants along with more
transparency of their decisions could improve the efficiency and moral alignment of
these bureaucracies while avoiding the temptations of corruption.
Here is another suggestive example. It may be more beneficial to modify the
governing rules of for-profit corporations so that instead of maximising profit under
the constraint of acting legally, they would be asked to maximise the common good,
which includes being able to operate and producing useful goods and services (so
selling more is good from that point of view) but also includes the impact of their
actions on the rest of society (e.g. through pollution, the well-being of their employ-
ees and customers, etc.). This would require a form of auditing which includes not
just financial aspects but also the evaluation of the positive and negative impact
on society, which could be translated into fiscal rewards or punishments. Of course,
these suggestions would make it more difficult to quantify the value brought by
corporations, but human-driven systems (requiring human judgement) to do such
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things already exist (e.g. to evaluate how to fund non-profit organisations or re-
search labs), so there are working precedents for more principle-based rewards for
agents.
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